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●抄録 　本稿は17世紀の盗賊・反逆者と帝国、民衆文化
と「価値観の普遍的統一体」としての帝国の関係
を、義賊・英雄を通じて具体的に実証する論考で
ある。ただ背後に、文化的な概念としての「帝国」
という点から、今日の価値の混沌を批判的に見よ
うとする意図が込められている。
　本稿の下地にあるひとつの仮設は、私たちが生
きている現在は、一九世紀に開始した「転換」の
過程の延長線上にある不安の時代であるというこ
と。すなわち決定的・最終的な大転換は起こらず、
逆に私たちの社会のほうが人間もろとも変質して
しまうのではないかという不安を生きる時代とし
て、現在を輪郭付けることができる。この「大転
換」不安を、「ポランニー（ハンガリー生まれの経
済人類学者）的不安」と呼ぶ向きもある。
　いまひとつの仮説は、この「ポランニー的不安」
が、一九世紀以降今日にいたる私たちの時代に固
有の条件ではないということである。たとえば、
「長い16世紀」（新大陸発見から17世紀）は、二世紀
に及ぶ長い交通の拡大の結果、新しい社会的文脈
として近世帝国を析出させた。このような「大転
換」は人類史において反復されてきた契機である。
つまり私たちが直面している「ポランニー的不
安」は人類史上初めての経験ではないのである。
　さて本稿の具体的な実証の対象はユーラシア大
陸西端のクロアティアでオスマン帝国と戦った騎
士ストヤン・ヤンコヴィチ（1636?—1687）、一方
はユーラシア大陸東端の中国とシナ海域で海商・
海賊として名をはせ、明清交代期に明のために戦
った国姓爺または鄭成功(1624—1662)である。
　ヤンコヴィチに関する民衆詩「捕われのストヤ
ン」は反オスマン帝国戦士の英雄伝であり、ハイ
ドゥクのようなバルカンの義賊に共通し、ロシア
のコサックにもじる民衆の英雄物語である。
　この詩・歌の内容は若きストヤンが戦闘の中で
オスマンの軍勢に拉致されてイスタンブルに捕ら
われる。その勇敢な兵士ぶりから彼はスルタンか
らも寵愛を受けるが、ついにはスルタンの財宝と
名馬を奪って故郷に帰り、妻や母と再会するとい
うもの。
　史実は、オスマン軍勢との戦いに多大な功績を
あげ、それが彼を雇ったヴェネツィアから高く評
価されたということである。ただ彼が戦ったのは、
自分の属する遊牧民集団モルラクを守るためだっ
たというのが真相である。
　次に鄭成功だが、国姓爺とは帝国から姓をさず
かった功労者という意味。その名は日本の江戸時
代の戯曲「国姓爺合戦」でも有名である。かれは
明の大義にこだわって清に対抗した正義の人物と
されてきた。また軍事的敗北から大陸を離れ、当
時オランダに支配されていた台湾を解放したとい
う見方もある。実際倭寇とりわけ実父鄭氏龍の、
また鄭成功の影響を排除するため海岸の居住地か
ら追い払われた人びとは台湾に逃れた。しかし台
湾で行った政策も封建制に過ぎず、鄭成功は自身
が明に代わって権力の座につきたかったという指
摘もある。結局は海賊に過ぎなかったという見方
もある。
　　　　　 　　　　　　　　 　　
　
　ストヤンはイギリスの歴史家ホブズボームが義
賊と呼んだバルカンの山賊ハイドゥクの一種とみ
ることができるが、正確に言えばロシアのコサッ
クに近い。帝国権力にたいする反抗の原初形態で
あり、境界に暮らす遊牧民の「生存」のために生
命を賭した戦士である。一方国姓爺は台湾解放の
英雄とみることもできるが、結局は内陸部を海上
の朝貢諸国とむすびつけ、清を真の世界帝国にな
らしめた、そういう意味の「帝国の英雄」である。
　実はストヤンは16世紀のアドリア海の海賊の流
れを組むのだが、同じく16世紀の海賊倭寇の流れ
を組む鄭成功とは対照的な顛末を迎えた。ただ大
事なことは、「境界」の人びとの見方と帝国の見方
の両極からユーラシア大陸の17世紀をみようとす
ることである。同様に21世紀においても、何かの
「価値の帝国」が問題となったとしても、「境界」の
反帝国ベクトルをたえず意識することが重要であ
る。このような態度こそが普遍主義の暴力性を浮
かび上がらせるのである。
2008年本学特別研究費を受けて作成した映像作品「ストヤン
／境界の英雄」より
左　越村の為に「捕らわれのストヤン」を謡うモルラクの末裔
右　財宝を奪ってスルタンのもとから逃げるストヤンと友人
出典：奈良修一、
『鄭成功』、山川出
版社、2016年。
鄭成功像 神になった鄭成功
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　Globalization is not a manifestation of the present but has existed since the early stages of world 
history. It happened in the so-called “long 16th century” (from the discovery of the new continent 
until the 17th century).  Different reactions to globalization were seen at that time, piracy being one 
example.  The pirates were seen at the western and eastern ends of the Eurasian continent.  One type 
of pirates of the “west” was called Uskoks. Pirates of the “east” were known as Wako. 
　I wrote two articles that can serve as a basic sketch for a comparative analysis of Uskok and Wako 
mainly in the 16th century.*  However, to delve further into the research of those pirate phenomena 
in context of social history, it would be better to find historical materials and research and study 17th 
century's successor bandits. The Uskok's inheritor during the following century was Stojan Janković 
(1636?–1687) and the Wako’s heir was Zheng Chenggong (1624–1662), more popularly known as 
Koxinga. Both were bandit leaders, who later on became heroes in their own way.  After the “long 16th 
century”, the activity of Stojan Janković reached the top during the stable and rather peaceful phase 
of the Habsburgs–Ottoman border conflict, while the activity of Zheng Chenggong overlapped with 
the establishment of the Qing Dynasty.  It has to be said, though, that the actual influence of Stojan 
Jankovićseems to be smaller than that of Koxinga.
*Two articles are : Isao Koshimura, Uskoks’ War Economy and the Making of the Early 
Modern Empire, Ekonomska i ekohistorija, Zagreb, 2016, pp.116 -135.
Isao Koshimura, The Wako’s Economic Warfare and the Making of the East Asian Seas’ 
Order, Ekonomska i ekohistorija, Zagreb, 2018, pp.225-249.
　This study aims to consider the relationship between people and power through the study of two 
bandit leaders: Stojan and Koxinga.
　Furthermore, I used Uskok to discuss its relationship with the Habsburg Empire in the 
aforementioned paper.  The Uskok War ended with the Habsburgs pushing the Uskoks to the inlands 
or mountains along the Adriatic Sea, where some bandits were called Hajduks.  It is well known that 
Eric Hobsbawm considered Hajduk as a sort of “Social Bandit”. 
　In Chapter 1, I will first clarify the term Uskok-Hajduk-Morlak (or Vlah), as well as the image of 
Stojan Janković.  Next, I will follow Uskok Stojan Janković's facts about the Morlak/Vlah community. 
Finally, I will describe the characteristics of Stojan as a “bandit” leader in comparison to the image of 
Hajduk. 
　In Chapter 2, we will first examine the change to the next wave of piracy after the first wave of 
Chinese piracy, which occurred in 1570.  In addition, I will give an overview of the activities of Zheng 
Zhilong, who belonged to the genealogy of Wako, and consider what kind of pirate he was though he 
was sometimes called a “social bandit”.  I will then give an overview of his son-Koxinga's activities, and 
ultimately reveal what Koxinga was, along with important points concerning the role he played in the 
formation of the early modern Qing Empire.
　In Chapter 3, the relationship between the banditry and the empire at the east and west ends of 
Eurasia after the 17th century will be analysed.  At the west end, the banditry of “border-soldiers”, 
which also included Uskoks, extended to the Urals.  On the other hand, the Chinese pirates from the 
18th to the 19th century were seafarers who did not try to remake the world.  However, piracy in the 
middle of the Qing Dynasty was the cause of social unrest, just like the Taiping Rebellion. 
*************************************************************
　I would also like to touch on the theoretical hypotheses of this paper.
　One of the hypotheses underlying this paper is that the age of anxiety we now live in is an extension 
of the process of ‘conversion’ that began in the 19th century.  In other words, it is possible to delineate 
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the present as an age of living insecurity that our society, together with human beings, will transform 
capitalistically. We would call this anxiety of conversion “Polanyi*anxiety”.1
*Karl Polanyi, 1886-1964, Austrian economic anthropologist
　Another hypothesis is that this “Polanyi anxiety” is not an inherent condition of our time, from 
the 19th century up to today. For example, the “long 16th century” has resulted in the emergence of 
the early modern empire as a new social context, as a result of the long expansion of traffic over two 
centuries. Such great “transformation” is an opportunity that has been repeated in human history. In 
other words, the “Polanyi anxiety” we face is not the first in history.2
　With these hypotheses, I conclude with the epilogue of this paper.
Chapter 1. Stojan Janković, a Social Bandit  
1-1. Stojan Janković as a legendary figure
　Boško Suvajdžić, though an expert of the Balkan literature, explains the Uskok-Hajduk phenomenon 
in Western Balkans between Hungary and Bulgaria as follows: There were two main centres of Hajduk 
liberation movement in the Balkans in the 16th and 17th centuries.  One was located “in the Danube 
Basin”, and the second “in the mountainous regions of the western part of the Balkan peninsula”. 
However, the Hajduk movement that developed “in the Adriatic Hinterland” during the advent of the 
Christian population in the military service of the Habsburg Empire and the Venetian Republic was 
much more important.3
　Uskok, on the other hand, represents “a special form of resistance to the Turks in the seaside 
hinterland”.4
　The inhabitants of the coastal hinterland were called Morlaks. The word is etymologically 
interpreted as an Italian name for Vlach herdsman. According to the Croatian Encyclopaedia, in the 
Croatian translation, the name Morovlasi means Crni Vlasi (Black Vlahs).5 
　After the end of the Cretan War (1645-1669), Venice settled people on deserted islands and the 
Venetian part of Istria. Ravni Kotari near Zadar, according to Suvajdžić, with celebrated Sergeant 
Stojan Janković, remains “the only significant Uskok centre” at the time.6  During the Obrovac march 
on Cetinje, young Stojan Janković was captured by the Turks.  This event is the source of the famous 
folk song “Abducted Stojan” (or The Captivity of Stojan Janković).  From here, we may reconstruct the 
image of a bandit.  The song first recalls the days when Stojan Janković and his colleague Ilija Smiljanić 
were in Istanbul.  There, the Sultan gave all the attention and courtesies to keep him faithful and in 
his service. However, Stojan and Ilija decided to get the keys of the treasury and the stable, steal the 
Morlak 
Hrvatski povjesni muzej
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Sultan's treasure and horses, “to flee to Ravni Kotari, to love the face of the unloved.” 7 
　When he arrives home, Stojan first paid a visit to the vineyard, where he would find the mother 
grieving. Stojan learns that his beloved was to remarry and that the wedding guests were in the house. 
He comes to his palace, the wedding guests receive him, he sings to them a song about a swallow and 
a grey-green falcon.  His love understands the meaning of the song.  She shakes her head and says that 
Stojan had arrived.  The wedding guests are confused and scared.  They are trying to point out their 
big expenses around the prospect.  Stojan calms them, gives them everything, to the young man and 
his sister.8
　This is not a song about heroic struggles and insights but a poem about family love, warmth, 
suffering, salvation, grievances, and joys.  This may be why the song is one of the most beautiful 
ballads from the cycle of Uskok songs. 
　The story would have a happy ending, but the emotional flow suddenly changes: When the mother 
returns home in the evening from the vineyard and finds her son back home and her daughter-in-law in 
the house, she dies of sudden joy and great happiness. 
　In short, an honourable knight, being well-treated by the Sultan, chose a hometown and family 
rather than an Ottoman career.  He will “return” what he had stolen to the wedding guests and will not 
bother anyone of them.  “It ends with the death of his mother.  Mother’s death can be considered a 
price for Stojan’s choice of returning home.” 9
　From the above image, we now shift to reality.
　Drago Roksandić is representative of the social history research on Stojan Janković today.  At the 
beginning of his work, Roksandić distinguished Uskoks and Hajduks as follows: “the greatest role 
in maintaining the ‘unity’ of the borderland region fell to the uskoks (fugitives) and the hajduks 
(outlaws).” 10  During the Morean War (Great Turkish War) since 1684, Venetians “had no alternative 
but to rely on the inventiveness and power of these mainly unwanted allies, primarily uskoks, and 
hajduks.”11  He mentioned Stojan Janković as the leader of Morlaks (Northern Dalmatian herdsmen). 
Of the three terms above, Uskok and Hajduk are the “legal” concepts of refugees and outlaws. Morlak, 
on the other hand, is an ethnic/social term similar to Vlah.  The Morlaks/Vlahs lived across three 
major states (Habsburg, Venetian, Ottoman) in the Croatian triple borderland*.  We, however, need to 
bear in mind that the Morlak/Vlah society was different from the concept of the modern nation.
*In the late 15th and early 16th centuries, the Ottomans penetrated deep into the Habsburg 
lands and into the Venetian possessions. 
1-2. The actions and behaviour of Stojan Janković
　Drago Roksandić, studying the life, actions, and behaviour of Stojan Janković, contributes to the 
interpretation of the social, economic and cultural change of the Croatian triple borderland from the 
“bottom up”.  He followed the preserved documents, especially “Istorija kotarskih uskoka” by Boško 
Desnica (sv.I: 1646-1684, Beograd, 1950, sv.II: 1684 – 1749, Beograd 1951).
　After the end of the Cretan War (January 1670), Stojan improved his position in the Venetian army. 
His request was relatively quickly granted by a decision of the Venetian Senate (March 1670), saying 
“he has been knighted by our Senate and given by us a gold chain with a medallion of St. Mark worth 
100 ducats in good currency…”12 
　Janković was highly appreciated, since his Morlaks were necessary for Venice.  Venice had poor 
military power on land.
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　The main field of Stojan’s activity was the Lika and Krbava basin located in the northern part of the 
Ottoman Empire. Although the Venetian Republic was still ambiguous about its tactical goals in Lika/
Krbava (See Sancak of Lika, Map1), there was no doubt that it needed as much influence in the area 
as possible. For the Habsburgs, on the other hand, Lika was a key area of the broadening path to the 
Adriatic Sea. Therefore, Lika became the place of military exploits for these two countries.  Both the 
Habsburgs and the Venetians first tried to weaken the Ottoman defence as much as possible, although 
these activities were not militarily coordinated.13  
i. ‘Small War’−Over the relocation of population
　For the Venetians, the most important and direct goal of the Morean war (1684 -1699) was to keep 
Lika as devastated and ruined as possible.14 
　More specifically, their purpose was to bring as much of the population, comprised mostly of Vlah 
people, to their side, along with all their moveable property, particularly their large and small livestock. 
After all, Vlahs/Morlaks were mostly Christians (although of Orthodox faith) and it was only natural, 
from Venetian and Habsburg perspective, to join forces with them against the Ottomans. 
　The specific war was waged for two full centuries in the triple-borderland area. Its main aim was “to 
expel and murder, or to take captive the population and destroy their material culture and economic 
resources”. This type of war had been called the “Small War.” 15
　For the Venetians, it was the best way to weaken the Ottoman military power, prevent the Habsburgs 
from becoming militarily established in Lika, and attack from Bosnia along the entire length of their 
common border. 
　The “Small War” was also an economic matter. The interests of Venice were clear. The Venetian 
authorities wanted to relocate some of Lika’s Vlahs to Karlobag (the opposite bank of island Pag)* and 
other cities in order to establish its economic influence in the area. Indeed, concerning the relocation, 
from the time of the Cretan War, the Venetian Republic had a solid relationship not only with the 
Morlak community inside the boundary but also with the Vlahs in the Ottoman Empire, particularly 
with their leaders. Therefore, the outlook for the Venetians in Lika was better than for the Habsburgs.16
*It was to effectively protect the Pag salt works and the trade of salt from Pag.  To make 
it successful, it was necessary to suppress the Karlobag for which the Venetians and the 
Habsburgs were fighting.
Map1. Venice, Croatia, Bosnia 
Source: Catherine Wendy Bracewell, The 
Uskoks of Senj: Piracy, Banditry, and Holy 
War in the Sixteenth-Centur y Adriatic , 
Cornell University Press, 1992.
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　Moreover, Ottoman Vlahs had a reason to move to Venice.  From the end of the 16th century to 
the end of the 17th century, the agricultural crisis in the socio-economic system of the Ottoman 
Empire steadily deteriorated, not only in comparison with the empire’s previous situation but also in 
comparison with its neighbouring countries.
　This meant that “it was no longer possible to expect the loyalty which for a long time the Ottomans 
had succeeded in securing from their Balkan subjects, both by their agrarian policies and their 
repressive religious  policy towards Christians.” 17
　In Lika, the state of war continued from 1685 to 1689, and the population was heavily displaced.  The 
Vlahs, the second most populated after the Muslims, fled the border into the area of Otočac to Brinje.  
According to Karl Kaser, between October 1685 and March 1686, 4,111 people from 530 households 
had crossed the border.  By 1689, there were almost no people in Lika.  Over the next 20 years, 
residents of the Lika district began to appear again.  However, the population was almost completely 
replaced; many of the Vlahs came from the Ottoman Empire.18 
　To bring as many spoils as possible, human slaves were also one of the most important aims of the 
war.  In fact, for these aims, there was no difference between warriors and its commander on all three 
sides of the frontier.  The greatest interests can be generated by buying and selling or using them as 
human slaves.  These benefits were regulated by the highest authorities of the state.  Thus, according 
to the 18 November 1684 narrative, it was decided that one-tenth of male slaves should be given to the 
state, to serve as members of the Venetian navy.  The number of captives and slaves was still on the rise 
in 1685.  In that year, despite all the changes, the Venetian authorities imposed a state tithe on slaves.  
Judged by a letter of Marin Michiel the Provveditor estraordinario commissario to the Senate (September 
26, 1685), these slaves were provided by Morlak's chiefs, in particular Janković and Bortulačić. 
　The Provveditor estraordinario commissario that appears here is the extraordinary commissioner, while 
the General provveditore is the general administrator, the highest position in the province of Dalmatia 
and Albania.
　An interesting point to note in Provveditorre general dell’armi is Domenico Mocenigo’s 
acknowledgement of Stojan Janković and his men, for “their exceptional bravery in battles with the 
Turks at Knin, Glamoč, and Grahovo (Sancak of Klis), as well as their success in devastating Lika 
and bringing back slaves.” 19  Incidentally, the Provveditorre general dell’armi is the superintendent for 
military and strategic issues in the wake of war.
ii. Loyalty in exchange for the survival guarantee
　The basis for Morlaks’ loyalty was the survival guarantee.  All three rulers governing the triple-
borderlands were well aware of that.  In fact, Šibenik’s local Provveditore mentions how severe Morlaks’ 
poverty was.  Thus, Provveditore general Valier frequently spoke of how “the instability and the lack of 
discipline of the Morlaks is difficult to govern and to make them obedient” 20 ; however, it would not 
overlook the interests of the Republic itself in ensuring that they had what they needed for basic life, to 
enable them to continue as their subjects.
　Marin Michiel also testified at the time that there was ‘an extreme shortage of food’ amongst the 
Morlaks under his command.  After the march to Knin in the winter of 1685, Michiel’s impression of 
Morlaks changed and “became much more favourable than the usual assessment by Venetian officers.” 
21  If their basic needs were recognized where the interests of the Republic were concerned, Venetian 
would have been able to get more from them as soldiers.  This motive arose more frequently as the war 
progressed. Again, it was a matter of ‘the principle of need’ in their relationship with the Morlaks. 
　In the war uncertainty of the triple-borderland, several Morlak communities faced difficulties 
in deciding whether their loyalty should be changed.  Morlaks’ mostly bad experiences in similar 
situations were additional burdens in making choices in new situations. 
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　The Provveditore general Pietro Valier reported (March 1687) one such case in Cetina.  When the 
Venetian side was promoting a Sinj capture operation that was large but could only achieve inadequate 
success, it was debated whether many Morlaks from Ottoman Cetina, headed by Sergent Ilija Peraić, 
would bother to join Venice.  It was only after pressure from the 3,000 Venetian Morlaks under the 
command of Stojan Janković and Šibenik captain Mihovil Zavorović that they crossed the Venetian 
territory.  Six hundred of them could take weapons.  At this time, they kept about 30,000 small livestock 
and about 10,000 cattle!  With the dissonance inside, they settled in the Trogir region at the decision of 
the Venetian authorities.  Although the form of accommodation was not a suitable living environment 
for communities with such large numbers of livestock, they were able to get as far away as possible 
from the devastating border areas.22
　Thus, the battle for the subjects in the Morean war was primarily a battle for the whole community, 
intending to persuade them to reach the Venetian side at the lowest possible cost.  To that end, there 
was hardly any means that was considered unacceptable if it succeeded in persuading them to pass 
from one side to the other.
　Led by Peraić, the above-mentioned Morlak community of around 1,600 people could settle close to 
Trogir because the authorities gave them the land of the abandoned Ottomans for their use.23
　The principle of loyalty, in service or as a subject, is fundamental to settle relationships of the 
military powers with peoples on the triple-frontier.  Loyalty may be voluntarily or forcibly related to 
circumstances, or “permanently”, following an agreement or imposition.  Its importance is emphasized 
because it was more than uncertain in the triple-frontier reality.
　In the triple-frontier, Janković was the person most at risk of frequent battles day and night, as 
he continued exploring solutions to secure their basic human needs as a basic condition for their 
effective service. “Stojan Janković was one of those Morlak leaders who did not see his service for 
the Venetian Republic as temporary, nor related to a specific situation.” 24  He was thus able to agree 
with the Venetian authorities that his allegiance to the republic includes not only obedience but also 
steadfastness. However, at that time, it was often difficult to find steadfastness in the triple-frontier 
Morlaks. 
　War, hunger, illness, and many other motives that arise from such situations can be the motive 
to change perspectives. “The Venetian Republic, in many cases, could do nothing to make life more 
bearable for the Morlachs and therefore relied on the Morlach chiefs as their most reliable guarantee 
of some kind of supervision of their dependent population.” 25 
iii. Morlak community and its leader
　Thus, the necessary elements were mainly made for the creation of the village’s Morlak leadership. 
Its status is partly based on the traditional Venetian way of regulating Morlak’s autonomy and partly on 
the new needs arising from the Morean war.
◆Mocenigo changed the policy on the Morlak communities
　In the spring of 1684, Mocenigo the Provveditore general dell’armi met with Morlak leaders: Sergent 
Smiljan Smiljanić, Count Franjo Posedarski, Sergent Stojan Janković, and Governor Šimun Bortulačić.
　Mocenigo agreed with them in that the only way to establish order was to appoint a chief of their 
choice in all Morak villages, and that the chief be empowered by the state to be more stable.26
　This was in contrast to Senj Uskoks.  The Habsburg captain was at the top of Senj’s power.  The 
difference from Uskoks of Senj also appears in the difference between awards and land grants: it was 
necessary to give dolmans (special jackets), medals, rings, or pays if they proved to be keen on their 
work.  On the other hand, the “new Morlaks” were given the abandoned “Turkish” land. In order for 
them to be attached to this land, they had to cultivate that land. 
　In the meantime, the new Morlaks came to the Venetian side, and there were more and more clashes 
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between the old and new Morlaks.  The influence of the Morlak chief on disputes was often a big 
issue. For the chiefs often got into conflict.  Moreover, when the republic entered the war, the new 
Morlaks came from the Bosnian side.  While it was convenient for the Venetian authorities to receive 
immigrants from the Bosnian side, it was no good for Morlaks to attack Vlah Christians from Bosnia, 
“which continued to occur on a regular basis.” 27 
　In the middle of July 1684, Mocenigo the provveditore general dell’armi decided to divide that entire 
region into eight groups of settlements, where along with Posedarski, Bortulačić, Janković, and 
Smiljanić, he gave a command to four more men from Venetia, effectively outsiders.28 
◆The reaction of Morlak leaders
　All Morlak leaders immediately reacted with a complaint to the Venetian Doge.  Although they 
were guaranteed their authority over the region and population, they considered they were robbed of 
what they had before the war.  Thus, they demanded from Venetians to withdraw the nomination of 
contending candidates.
　In this situation, Vrana’s Morlaks began to get confused.  Their request was directed to the Governor 
Šimun Bortulačić.  They sought the privileges they had already achieved under Ottoman rule and they 
unanimously asked for Sergent Smiljanić as their chief, and for their captain, Count Ilija Radašinović. 
The demands of the people of Vrana (Sancak of Klis) for the renewal of privileges from the rule of the 
Ottoman Empire were just the “climax” of these efforts, as it was expressed during the war with the 
Ottomans.
　Thus, there was an increasing concern over how Dalmatia’s Venetian authorities would secure 
the Morlak’s greatest allegiance with the Republic.  However, there was a conviction that the right 
evaluation could play an important role in relieving the wave of new frustration involving new and 
old Morlak.  In some cases, they were able to distribute salaries and financial rewards, “which was 
something the Venetian authorities were usually extremely reluctant to do.” 29 
　On May 12, 1684, Mocenigo awarded Morlaks’ standard supporter, Kojadin Žepina, one Ducat per 
month for losing his hand in the battle at the tower of Durak Begović in Plavno near Knin.  It was to 
ensure that both his deeds and his rewards served as an example for others.
　At that time, the Venetian had about 5,000-6,000 new and old Morlak soldiers who could be armed. 
However, in the Venetian opinion, they were not used to principles of conduct and obedience, so they 
tended to strike back, rob, and escape from the battlefield.  For Morlak soldiers to be useful soldiers, 
they had to be used together with mercenaries.30
iv. The rise and fall of Stojan Janković
　The reality of the war will soon require a different relationship with the Morlaks, especially in 
situations where the Venetians have failed, especially in the April 1685 attack on Sinj (Sancak of Klis). 
In June, Pasha in Bosnia was aiming for Zadvarje near Omiš, the results could have very serious 
consequences, and the Venetians’ first measures require a quick gathering of forces comparable to 
Ottomans as much as possible.  That was impossible without Morlaks.  The need was even more 
Portrait of Stojan Janković
Source: Drago Roksandić, Stojan Janković in the Morean War, or on Uskoks, Slaves and Subjects 
(expanded version), in Drago Roksandić & Nataša Štefanec, Constructing Border Societies on the 
Triplex Confinium, CEU History Department Working Paper Series 4, Budapest, 2000.
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urgent as Pasha in Bosnia likewise had many Vlahs available to him on the side of Bosnia.  These 
Morlaks will need to be paid; hence, the need to rely mainly on Stojan Janković and his men. 
　The reliance on Morlak chiefs' success in their military activities continued to grow.  Marin Michiel, 
in his report to the Senate (1 January 1686), could not hide his surprise at a letter from the General 
provveditor Valier to Stojan Janković. In the letter, Valier asked Michiel to accept Janković’s request 
for bread or ammo.  In this way, Janković got what he needed for 2,000 men even without telling the 
Proveditor estraordinario commissario about its purpose.31
　When Janković returned to Lapac from a march in Lika after 10 days, “the rewards with 1,200 new 
settlers, 3,000 livestock heads including 500 large animals, and the length of bounty were divided up 
amongst the Morlachs themselves.” 32  As Michiel reported with extreme bitterness, Janković left only 
one useless slave to the republic.
　In the Lika region battle of 1685-86, Stojan’s success reached a climax.  Below, the two faces of 
Stojan are shown with respect to his success in military action and to Stojan’s role in the relocation and 
“plundering” of people.
Stojan’s success in military action
In June 1685  The Commanding officer of the Habsburg Karlovac military district Count 
Herberstein called the General provveditore Valier to take part in a joint campaign in Lika.  
Colonel Posedarski and Sergent Janković went off to Lika
In August and at the beginning of September 1685  Several thousands of Janković's Kotari and 
Tartaglini’s Kaštel Morlaks, with some mercenary troops, marched into Bosnia, Bilaj, Vakuf 
na Uni, Srb
By the spring of 1686  Janković’s fame was at its peak.  Considering the true goal of the 
Ottomans was going to break the siege of Sinj, Janković’s 1,600 men from Kotari were sent an 
order to be in readiness
At the end of the summer of 1686  Janković and Smiljanić set out on a major campaign, 
commanding 5,000 infantrymen and 1500 horsemen, in the Livno region following the news of 
the approach of a large Ottoman army, led by the Pasha of Zvornik, Bastić, and the Alay-beg 
Filipović
In the same year  Janković was allowed to form an overseas military 
unit in the Levant under command of his son Colonel Nikola.
　Stojan’s role in the relocation and ‘plundering’ of people.
　The Ottoman Army abandoned many settlements in response to the double attack by the Austrian 
and Venetian forces.  The Morlak “gang” looted and burned everything, starting from the village of 
Rebac. The Vlah households in the area crossed into the Venetian side.  It means that 2,561 passed to 
the left bank of the river Zrmanja.33
　At the beginning of August 1685, Marin Michiel advised their leaders, gathered in Zadar, “to leave 
a barbaric land and the dominion of the tyrant to recover under the one who is the most just in the 
world.” 34  They were granted considerable amount of food (200 stara di formento in circa) for the time 
being to help them settle, which was to be delivered when they had all crossed to the Venetian side.
　During August and at the beginning of September 1685, the Ottomans left their village and gathered 
around the best fortress. In the case of Bilaj (Bosnia), this was disastrous.  However, the greatest 
advantage for the Venetian is that the Vlahs of the Serbian Orthodox Church had been relocated to the 
Venetian side.  Stojan Janković played a key role in that as well.35 
　In the winter of 1686, the Venetians were again concerned about the planned campaign by the 
Habsburgs and Ottomans.  At that time, getting reliable information seemed more difficult.  Stojan 
Janković appears to be the most successful in this regard.  It seems that there were people all over 
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triple borderland who kept telling him what was happening.  Many of these seemed to be newly settled 
Morlaks.36 
　During the counterattack of the Ottoman Empire in northern Dalmatia in late November 1686, 
Janković already commanded 300 troops and called them to his regiment.  The recruitment of such a 
large number of people likely to be despatched to other battlefields, particularly the Levant, had the 
potential of weakening their defences at Dalmatia, where the Venetians did not have the real potential, 
thus causing fear to many people.  Meanwhile, other Morlak chiefs had difficulty securing soldiers 
because of their interest and envy.  Under such circumstances, the Venetian authorities relied strongly 
on Janković for his ability and loyalty, so that no complaints had any effect on the official relationship 
with him.37
　However, Janković might be too important for the Venetian authorities, as he was most successful 
on the battlefield that was very important to them.  The Venetian authorities could not match his 
power. It was Ravni Kotar's leaders (Janković and others) who destroyed the area around Knin in June, 
especially the 25 mills.  Their purpose was to rebuild the area, particularly the military fortress.  Again, 
many houses and buildings were burned up by Morlaks' large army.  Numerous valuables and useful 
items were looted.  Janković and Smiljanić also report that the entire area around Livno was completely 
devastated across a 50 mile stretch.38 
　During the siege of Herceg Novi near Kotor, Janković went far with a troop and pillaged the outskirts 
of Ottoman Tomislavgrad (Duvno), Livno and Glamoć, where he was killed on 23 August 1687.
　Knin was to fall in September 1688.  Although he died almost a decade before the end of this war in 
1699, “his death coincided with the time when Morlach's way of fighting, for the most part, began to 
lose its purpose for the Venetian republic.” 39
1-3. Stojan Janković as a social bandit
　The legend of Stojan Janković belongs to the genealogy of Uskok-Hajduk legends.  Now, considering 
the activities mentioned in the previous section and the circumstances behind it, I will examine below 
whether he can historically be classified as Hajduk, while referring to the “social bandit” and other 
studies after Hobsbawm. 
　First of all, Hobsbawm’s definition of a social bandit may be summarized into two points: (a) being 
a criminal from the point of view of a ruling power, but being a “social bandit” who is perceived as 
performing “justice” for the people, and (b) being a “social bandit” who lives around and has constant 
contact with the people.40  (a) is a definition that is based exclusively on an image, while (b) is a 
condition that is required as a reality.  We would adopt these two as definitions of a social bandit. 
However, with regard to usage of these words in this article, the broadly defined “social bandit” has 
only (a), and the narrowly defined “social bandit” should have (a) and (b).
　As for Stojan, if we look at the features emphasized in the social bandit studies since Hobsbawm, 
he is, as we saw in the previous section, a social bandit in the sense of both (a) and (b).  We should 
recall his looting and destruction activities in the Ottoman empire, dedication to the community and its 
survival, and communication with the people.
　However, when we examine his behaviour more closely, he differs from the (arche) typical Hajduk. 
Hobsbawm himself positions “Haiduk” as an important form of a bandit, similar to “Noble Robber” and 
“Avenger”.  “Haiduk” is the type recognized and constant in its social function, more institutionalized 
and structured.  In other words, if we look at many of Balkan’s Hajduks, even if they tend to be Hajduks 
because they, economically, earn more than agricultural workers, it is considered that there is a 
political impediment to becoming Hajduks.  “To put up in the state of the uprising” was significant for 
them, and he was always in the mountains, always favouring men and women with temperament and 
continuing to be a political heresy.  From the peasant’s perspective, Hajduk was a source of respect and 
admiration, not a target of fear.  Hobsbawn asks Hajduks for political terms.41 
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The following is a historiographical explanation of Hajduk by Shingo Minamizuka, a Japanese historian 
who is familiar with Hungarian and Bulgarian history, in his book World History of Outlaws.42
　Given all the differences in their origins (the cattlemen, the villagers expelled by the Ottomans, the 
peasants who fled from subordination to the lord when the Ottoman army advanced), Hajduks were 
truly guerrilla resistant to the Ottoman army.  Therefore, they were given the image of a bandit.  The 
bandit mentioned here is an entity that embodies justice seen from the people’s perspective.  However, 
after they were active in the rebellion against the Ottomans (1591-1606) of the nobles led by Bocskai 
István (1557- 1606), they would compromise with the lord in the 17th century, gain land, settle, and end 
their role as bandits. 
　In seventeenth-century Balkan, the transition from the Timar system (peasants were in a position 
to be the state’s serf) to the Chiftlik system began to progress.  The Chiftlik is a sort of manor for 
commodity production by de facto private landowners which appearance led to the mixing of soldiers 
and peasants, two separate categories in the Ottoman Empire.  The burden on peasants has been 
strengthened. Under these circumstances, some Balkan villagers were more likely to leave the 
village, go into the mountains, and enter bandit life.  They were called Haydutin, among other things. 
Minamizuka emphasizes that Hajduk is a social category which often includes anti-system sentiment.
　Bulgaria has been under Ottoman rule since the 14th century (1385).  In the 17th century, there 
again appeared more Haydutin. In the 16th century, one of the famous masters of the Hydra region, 
Tre Voyvoda, was active. In the seventeenth century, Haydutin’s troops began to move around.  The 
traces are seen in the Vidin, the Sofia, the Pazardzi, and the Rhodope region.  Above all, Chavdal in the 
Sofia region is said to have led the bout with the son of his sister.
　According to the legend, they not only revenged the tyrannical actions of the “Turks,” but also 
manifested the people’s pure virtue.  They were innocent, fair, unwilling to the ego, and fighters 
without compromise.  There was no such thing as raising their hands to the poor and the afflicted. 
Their morality was strict, and their attitude towards women and mothers was said to be ethical.  Thus, 
they are regarded “righteous bandits” by the Bulgarian people who were under Ottoman rule.
　The Haydutins roam the mountains, watch the forts, mountains, roads, and alleys, strike the Turkish 
escort’s by surprise, and suddenly attack military personnel and officials.  They frequently released 
the Bulgarians who were taken away by oppressors to send to the slave market in Crete and Cyprus.  
Often, some of the looted products were partly returned to the poor people who produced them 
through hard labour.
　The Haydutin movement, in reality, occurred when the Ottomans were invading the Balkans and 
ensured the continuity of local ethnic resistance to the oppressor.  This movement was not only 
directed towards feudal pressure but was also an ethnic aspiration for freedom and justice.  However, 
we cannot agree with the fact that it is a holder of national consciousness and a precursor of national 
movements in the modern sense. 
　Compared with such Hajduks, Uskoks/Morlaks did not fight against the system and imperial powers 
within the scope of one empire.  It was not a group that was temporarily formed for an imminent goal.43
　Certainly, there is a difference between Uskoks and Morlaks - Morlak is a designation for all who 
migrated from the Ottoman Empire to Venetian territory, live off livestock and are usually Orthodox, 
however, do not necessarily participate in military actions.  Uskok is a somewhat closed community 
with a more clearly defined code of military nature.  It may also be related to historical differences as 
described below.  Although, after arriving to the Christian territory, both battled with the Ottomans 
as an enemy, Uskok piracy had a deep shade of revenge and often a strong passion to earn profit from 
unstable circumstances on the triple imperial border. Emphasis is further placed on the advocacy of 
Christianity, especially if one needed to justify its plundering actions to the Christian authorities.  After 
all, Uskoks of Senj were partly(not all) enrolled as the Habsburg paid soldiers system and their piracy 
was stopped by  Habsburg’s orders.  Many Morlaks, on the other hand, fought for survival and did 
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not have a chance to serve in the paid army.  Stojan fought in the Venetian army, fighting also for the 
survival of his population.  According to folk songs, Christianity, in the case of Morlak, did not come 
to the forefront, compared to Senj, because Morlak communities were much more dispersed to creat 
a common ideological narrative. Stojan lost his life fighting for the Venetian state which ensured the 
survival for his Morlaks.
　Though there are obvious differences in comparison with Uskoks, Morlaks should also be classified 
into the same group as Cossacks, who also acted at the boundaries of empires, rather than Hajduk as a 
broad concept.  If we agree with Alfred J. Rieber who divided the border-free soldiers into cases where 
the population movement was stable and unstable, Stojan and his men would belong to the latter.44  The 
theory of Rieber will be described in detail in Chapter 3.
Chapter 2. Koxinga, an Imperial Hero
　The late imperial age of South China was “the golden age of Chinese piracy.”
　According to Robert J. Antony, the golden age of Chinese piracy developed in stages, “surging in 
three great waves: one from 1522 to 1574, another from 1620 to 1684, and the last from 1780 to 1810.” 45
　i. 1522 to 1574: The first wave was the age of the so-called Wako pirates, composed of Chinese, 
Japanese, and other raiders.  Piracy was largely an inherent by-product of the Ming sea bans.  
This was a time of great merchant-pirates such as Wang Zhi and others, who combined trade with 
raiding. 
　ii. 1620 to 1684: The next pirate wave occurred during the Ming-Qing “dynastic wars.”  Piracy was 
symptomatic of the political anarchy, economic instability, and social dislocations of the era.  Many 
of the “sea rebels” (Haikou) fused commerce with piracy and insurgency.  The Zheng family, who 
used the chaos to build a huge “marine kingdom,” epitomized the pirate merchant rebels of this 
era.  After the collapse of the Ming Dynasty in 1644, piracy and revolts increased dramatically in 
southern China, including Taiwan. 46
　iii. 1780 to 1810: The third wave was marked by the rise of several “ocean bandits,” or seafarer-
pirates (we will discuss this wave in more detail later).
　Below, we look more closely at the situation between 1620 and 1684 and at the factors that caused 
the second wave of pirates.
◆The Ming-Qing transition and the second wave of Chinese piracy
　By the 1620s, the relative stability and prosperity compared to the past several decades were 
crushed suddenly.  The invasion by the Manchus of the northeastern frontier disputed Ming 
sovereignty.  The financial strain of fighting this invasion, among other factors, caused the Ming state 
to break down.
　In 1567, the Ming court began trading with foreign countries, but after 1623 it began to ban maritime 
trade intermittently.  By 1626, foreign trade was completely banned (except for 1631 to 1632).
　At the same time, China’s economy stagnated and then declined as a result of the sharp decline in 
bullion imports from overseas. Silver decline and cash decline affected the coastal economies in Fujian 
　Province and Guangdong Province, which relied on maritime trade.  In the late 1630s and through 
the 1640s, foreign trade substantially stopped and prices in coastal areas soared.
　Although such economic situations were also experienced in the Adriatic Sea, in East Asia the 
economic problems were compounded by natural disasters.  An unusually large numbers of floods, 
droughts, and typhoons destroyed crops and caused food shortages.
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　In Guangdong Province, the people experienced hunger every year between 1642 and 1665.  In 1648, 
hunger and epidemics devastated areas from Guangdong to Zhejiang. Food prices soared, and thieves 
and pirates appeared everywhere.  The misery was awful in Shin’an County: “In the lower Canton delta, 
men and women were sold for a peck of rice, and human corpses were butchered for food.” 47
　During the Ming-Qing transition from 1620 to 1684, piracy in Guangdong Province and Fujian 
Province peaked in the 1640s and 1660s.
　Having seen opportunities in the prevailing insecurity and confusion, the Zheng family created 
a marine kingdom in Fujian and Taiwan based on a combination of trade, piracy, and political 
manipulation.48  Other pirates, like Liu Xiang, mimicked the Zheng organization but on smaller scales.
2-1. Wako, Zhen Zhilong, Social Bandit
　Zheng Zhilong was a pirate who already dominated the lucrative Fujian-Taiwan trade network from 
his strongholds on Xiamen (Amoy) and neighboring islands. (See map.1)
　The network was to be the basis of his marine kingdom.
◆Rise period: Japan-Taiwan trade, the formation of a strong organization
　Zheng Zhilong became a pirate and smuggler, leading a junk fleet under the command of Yan Siqi. 
　This Yan, like Li Dan, belonged to the lineage of Wako.  Zhilong showed audacity in junk ship raids 
and looting and gained the respect of his leaders/fellows.  He also made use of a kinship network in his 
Fujian coastal homeland.
　At the time, Taiwan held an important position for both for Zhilong and the Dutch.  The Dutch, who 
had not been allowed to trade by the Ming, established Zeelandia Castle in southern Taiwan in 1624 
and made it a hub for East Asian trade.  At that time, Taiwan was not considered to be Ming territory, 
but it was essential for trade with Japan.  Zheng Zhilong was originally one of the Dutch VOC (United 
East India Company since 1602)-supported pirates.  The head of the Dutch factory in Taiwan, Gerrit 
Fredericksen de Witt, equipped his men with ships and weapons.  The factory (not Netherlands) also 
allowed Zhilong to maintain and inherit the Wankan base north of Tayouan and raise the Dutch flag as 
he plundered. 
　Through a combination of persuasiveness and intense firepower advantage, Zheng Zhilong won a 
considerable share of the material and human resources left by Li and Yan.  Then, he took steps to 
integrate and extend his organization.  Zhilong seems to have introduced a hierarchical rank structure 
among his new subordinates instead of more friendly cooperation in regular smuggling and piracy 
activities. He also replaced the thorough looting of the ship with more complex protective rackets. 
Zhilong “set up floating markets on his Junks” off the Penghu Islands and imposed a tax on the sailing 
ships unofficially called floating payment.  “He even took advantage of a devastating famine in Fujian at 
the time” 49 to gain more minions by encouraging refugees to emigrate and settle on his Wankan base. 
　Zhilong’s organization was ranked among the most organized, armed, and prosperous.  By 1627, 
the Dutch VOC judged Zheng Zhilong had grown too large and feared his “increasingly intimate 
cooperation with the Japanese.” 50  He was active in Japan when he was young.  It is said that Zhilong 
was acquainted with even Ieyasu Tokugawa.  The new head of the Dutch factory in Taiwan, Pieter 
Nuyts, offered to liquidate Zhilong in exchange for an agreement from the court to gain free access to 
China and asked for a meeting with Ming officials.
　A failed attempt by VOC to secure free trade from the Ming revealed to Zhilong how vulnerable 
the Dutch were.  More importantly, in achieving this goal, he learned to recognize the value of a 
stable foundation with normalized access to product suppliers, as well as “the importance of symbolic 
capital, especially legitimacy and legality.” 51  Zhilong saw that obedience to the Ming, if he accepted 
it, could offer all of these and more.  Besides, he was convinced that his marine kingdom gave him a 
huge advantage that allowed him to determine the conditions of his submission and then maintain the 
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greatest possible independence of action afterward. 
◆Towards the top: dominating the three coastal states
　In 1627 and 1628, Zhilong launched a devastating assault on the mainland.  He occupied the county 
seats of Quanzhou Province and Zhangzhou Province, killed one garrison commander, and sank 
hundreds of the best Ming ships.  During his raid, Zhilong limited his plunder to the wealthy and won 
more supporters to his side by distributing some of the spoils to the poor.  In 1628, a great famine in 
the Shaanxi region caused rebellion. Li Zicheng, who would defeat the Ming dynasty in 1644, joined the 
rebellion and became its leader.52 
　Also in 1628, Zhilong occupied Xiamen, the headquarters of Ming anti-piracy efforts.  “Zhilong then 
initiated contact with the gentry of Quanzhou, especially those of his hometown and Anhai with ties to 
his clan.” 53  Using a captured Ming official, he sent a request to the Fujian authorities to fight piracy on 
their behalf and under their authority to show his sincerity.  Zheng Zhilong thus became a high Ming 
official, maintaining a power base of 600 troops.  He also recruited peasants to his service on land and 
equipped a fleet of fishing boats at sea.  From these humble foundations, he built a mercenary force 
from scratch with a developed hierarchy.
　By 1630, Zhilong had shattered most of the pirate bands and broken the Fujian authorities’ attempts 
to register individual pirates to threaten his unique position.  The sea ban was lifted “temporarily” in 
the following year as the calm continued in the coastal area.  Officially, Zhilong was also promoted to 
deputy commander of Fujian.54
　In Taiwan, the VOC took advantage of their activities by issuing passes and encouraging ships 
to display the Dutch flag.  However, the company had one major weakness.  VOC ships relied on 
continuous access to the Chinese product sources offered by Zheng Zhilong.  In 1641, he violated his 
previous agreement with the VOC and the ban on trading with Japan by sailing directly from Anhai to 
Nagasaki.  The following year, his ships accounted for a quarter of China’s total merchant fleet, moving 
80 percent of all cargo transported by sea.55
　Meanwhile, Taiwan gradually lost its role as a regional entrepôt because of the domination of 
Zhilong’s China-Japan exchanges.  Instead, in the 1640s, the island resembled a colonial economy 
characterized by the monoculture of sugar and the extraction of deer hunted by forest and mountain 
natives.  Soon, a large number of Chinese immigrants flowed into Taiwan to cultivate land and trade 
with the natives.  In the 1640s, more than 10,000 people lived on the sparsely populated island.56
◆From Ming to Manchus
　In the summer of 1644, the Ming Dynasty collapsed.  Zheng Zhilong joined Ming restoration efforts 
for a while before abandoning his former masters and approaching the Qing Dynasty. 
　The worldview and the interests of the Ming emperor and Zheng Zhilong diverged fundamentally. 
Zheng Zhilong hoped to utilize the emperor to legalize and strengthen the autonomy of his satrapy in 
Fujian and his own East Asian commercial network.  On the other hand, Zhilong had no solid basis 
for the aforementioned symbolic capital, legitimacy, and legality.  He could not justify giving priority 
to his army over his obligatory duty as a Confucian minister to help the Heavenly Son in restoring the 
emperor’s rightful place in the center of the universe.  Without status and title from Emperor Longwu 
(a pretender to the throne of the then-collapsing Ming dynasty), he had to rely solely on his charisma.57
　Scholars generally regard the pretender’s ideal of restoration as an unrealistic fancy, in contrast 
to Zhilong’s more practical approach based on a rational assessment of the limitations of his military 
protection.  In the conventional view, historians tend to view Zhilong as a Confucian opportunist.  As 
John Wills pointed out, Zhilong shared much of the Longwu pretender’s vision and made a great effort 
to reconcile it with his “personal interests.” 58  Zhilong believed that, for a task as large as the expulsion 
of the Manchu invaders, support could spread quickly from the grassroots level to the entire empire 
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only through the region’s autonomy.  However, by early 1646, Zheng Zhilong was no longer able to pay 
for his men to protect the entire province.  With a sense of alienation from the Longwu pretender and 
his officials, Zhilong decided to abandon the court.
　Meanwhile, he began a dialogue with the Qing through the mediation of several trusted Quanzhou 
gentry who were then collaborating with the Manchus.  He received the emperor’s inscription from 
the Shunzhi Emperor and received full authority with the title of king of the three states of Zhejiang, 
Fujian, and Guangdong.  The offer sounded attractive.  It gave him the regional autonomy that he had 
always pursued and which he could no longer maintain under the Longwu court.  The only condition 
was that he had to travel to Beijing for an imperial audience to “hear more of his extraordinary merit 
and achievements.” 59  Eventually, he was executed by the Qing Dynasty in 1661 when his son captured 
Taiwan. 
◆Zheng Zhilong: a social bandit?
　Zhen Zhilong was sometimes evaluated as a social bandit before joining the government. 
Andrade notes his image of a social bandit as a factor that Zheng Zhilong used to rapidly expand his 
organization.  He cultivated the image of the “noble robber,” a seaborne Robin Hood who robbed the 
rich to feed the poor, and stories of his generosity abound.60
　He appears also to have been careful to avoid violence against the common people, preventing his 
followers from pillaging those who cooperated, especially near his homeland in Nan’an.61  The image 
went over well, and thousands of men joined his fleets.  Many joined out of desperation when drought 
and famine persuaded them to take their chances with the pirates.62  However, it should be considered 
a manipulation: The marine kingdom in Fujian and Taiwan was based on a combination of trade, piracy, 
and political manipulation.  First of all, profit and organization were important for Zheng Zhilong, and 
the final goal was to realize the marine kingdom.63
　Let us look at the analysis of Andrade and Hang here. In the history of the Ming Empire, dozens of 
pirate groups were as powerful as those of Zheng Zhilong, but none were as successful. Scholars have 
given various explanations for the rise of Zhilong, including the local clan, strong army, personal talent, 
recruitment of government, access to private ports, and huge trading interests.  However, in order to 
maintain a strengthened organization, Zhilong had a problem of how to secure the economic base.64
　In the harsh natural conditions already mentioned, securing supplies was the most urgent task. 
Meanwhile, the chaos and warfare caused by the Qing invasion of the Yangtze River delta drastically 
decreased the supply of raw silk to Zheng Zhilong’s ports in Fujian.  Zhilong, on the other hand, did 
not want to leave Fujian. He thus opted to squeeze as much as possible from Fujian.  Regardless of 
the province’s impoverished state, he raised taxes and extorted huge sums of money and grain from 
gentry and wealthy commoners and increasingly required, “impoverished peasants, to pay and feed his 
troops in the hopes of riding out the crisis.” 65  It would be difficult to think that relief of the people was 
his first goal. 
　Zheng Zhilong is completely different from Li Zicheng, leader of the anti-Ming rebellion.  On the 
other hand, as written in his own book, his organization was for the marine kingdom, even if the 
restoration of the Ming Dynasty was his idea.  It would be difficult to think of him as a social bandit. 
2-2 Koxinga as a Pirate and More
　Zheng Zhilong was upset by the fall of the Ming Dynasty in 1644 and only surrendered to the 
Manchu in 1646.  However, many of his clan, especially his son Zheng Chenggong, continued to resist 
the Qing in the name of Ming loyalism.  During this political turmoil, Zheng Chenggong gained power 
in both Fujian and part of Guangdong.  He received the title of the Koxinga from the Ming in 1645 and 
raised an anti-Qing army in 1647.  Chenggong was in command of the Zheng family organization by 
1651.
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　Koxinga oversaw the marine kingdom, funded by plunder and coercion as much as by trade.  The 
core of his followers remained pirates, and he continued to earn much of his income and supply from 
raids on coastal areas. In other words, he was, first of all, a pirate. For example, in 1657, his forces 
robbed a village in Xinghua County, abducted children, and killed over 1000 people.66  Once the 
Manchus came to power in 1644, they saw Zhen Chenggong and other Chinese pirates as serious 
threats to the realm.
◆Qing policy against pirates
　Beginning in 1652, the Qing court issued a series of tough sea bans aimed at separating pirates from 
their land support.  In rapid succession, the emperor ordered coastal officials to burn all boats and 
to bar the purchase of foreign-made vessels and the sale of Chinese vessels to foreigners 67.  Chinese 
merchants from Shandong to Guangdong were barred, under penalty of death, from going to sea. 
Stricter than the Ming ban, the Qing thus banned both foreign and coastal maritime trade.
　Still unable to control Zheng and other pirates, the government adopted a scorched-earth policy 
between 1661 and 1662, and the coastal residents in most of Fujian Province and Guangdong Province 
were forced to relocate 10 to 20 miles inland.  “The authorities also began to hunt down agents of 
Koxinga’s Five Mountain Firms*, break his covert spy rings, and seize merchants caught transporting 
goods to areas under his control.” 68
*Firms named after gold, wood, water, fire, and earth, respectively.  The Five Mountain Firms 
worked deep in Qing territory to procure silk, porcelain, and other luxury goods and deliver 
them to Xiamen in a timely manner.
　The measure signaled the first steps in what became an increasingly successful policy of cutting 
off contact between people on the mainland and Zheng’s men.  While not destroying Koxinga, these 
harsh actions had a devastating effect on the coastal inhabitants who relied on the sea for their lives. 
Numerous local pirates, including the followers of Koxinga, surrendered and joined the imperial forces 
to fight their former comrades.69
　Then, in 1684, after Qing forces had seized the rest of the Zheng heirs in Taiwan and finally secured 
control of the whole of China, the Kangxi Emperor rescinded nearly all of the remaining sea bans. 
Convinced that national security depended on the prosperity and stability of the southern coastal 
states, the Qing court legalized foreign and coastal junk trade and opened several ports to foreign 
trade.  As the economy quickly recovered, expanded, and thrived, piracy fell quickly.
◆Koxinga more than a pirate
　Robert J. Anthony briefly called Koxinga a “merchant-pirate-rebel.” 70  On the other hand, Xing Hang 
discusses in detail what Koxinga aimed at in the fight with the Qing Dynasty, based on the various 
conventional interpretations on Koxinga.  In the following analysis, Hang’s work Conflict and Commerce 
in Maritime East Asia will be used as a main reference.
　Most historians in East Asia and the West consider Koxinga a “Ming loyal.”  Some consider his 
devotion to the cause of the restoration of the Ming dynasty as “fanatic.”  Others point out persuasive 
evidence of “opportunistic” behavior that contradicts this badly decided stance.
　Lynn Struve and John Wills, on the other hand, have taken a step further and showed how Koxinga 
combined his own interests with those of the Ming and did his best to remain loyal.71  Furthermore, 
“one must take into account what exactly constituted Koxinga’s program of restoration, as well as 
changes over time and in the relative power balance between the loyalist courts and the Qing.” 72
　Without doubt, Koxinga in his early days idealized a reconstituted Ming Empire, but he wanted, like 
his father, to enjoy the greatest possible autonomy within it.  Koxinga aimed at the construction of the 
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marine kingdom from a young age, with Ming restoration as its logical extension.  He was originally 
a bureaucrat and is considered to be far from a social bandit.  Then, let us look at the specific points 
below to see what Koxinga was.
i. 1651 as a turning point
　Before 1651, Koxinga appeared to have placed genuine sentiments for Ming restoration above 
his personal interests.  Koxinga was “a hot headed youth in his twenties, ready to change the world 
according to his vision.” 73  The outside climate gave the young idealist great hope.  In 1649 and 1650, 
when the two main Qing commanders were deposed, the Ming’s Yongri court received a big boost.  In 
1651, Li Dingguo, a military general who fought against the Qing Dynasty, wrote a letter to Koxinga 
from Guangzhou, calling upon him to join forces in a northern expedition to recapture Nanjing and 
Beijing from the Manchus. Seeing that restoration was imminent, Koxinga did not hesitate to mobilize 
most of his power and lead it to Guandong, leaving only a small garrison under his uncle Zheng Zhiwan 
to protect their stronghold.  Qing soldiers successfully used this tactical situation to attack Xiamen. 
Koxinga immediately ordered the execution of Zhiwan and Zhiwan’s men for their timidity and even 
exposed their severed heads to the Xiamen market.  However, the serious setback in the fight at 
Xiamen removed the impetuousness of youth from Koxinga and made him realize that before he began 
a restoration campaign for others, he needed to make sure he had a strong, cohesive organization of 
his own.74
ii. Koxinga’s organization and economic policy
　The core of the organization’s leadership consisted of Koxinga’s relatives and his father’s former 
subordinates.  Those with a background as soldiers and merchants had grown up in Minnan (southern 
Fujian), knew the coastal ports, and had many years of maritime experience.  Many had also been 
Zhilong pirate associates before joining the Ming.
　Koxinga was supported by many senior officials and academic experts.  In addition, residents of the 
coastal areas of Fujian Province formed a grass-roots base, supplying the majority of Koxinga’s infantry 
and sailors.  They paid him taxes and additional fees and provided labor services.  The burden was 
great and often annoying, and many people were ruined. Some had to sell their wives and children 
to achieve their goals.  Though Koxinga was far from a social bandit, he promoted the life of civilians 
in coastal Fujian Province based on fishing, salt production, and especially maritime trade as a feudal 
obligation.75
　As had been the circumstance during the time of Zhilong, anyone could travel and trade abroad 
as long as they purchased a permit, based on ship size and distance to destination, issued with the 
name of Koxinga.  These permits stimulated other opportunities from cash crops and artisan crafts 
to shipbuilding and services—activities that the mainland dynasty was greatly hampering at the 
time.76   Despite severe tensions and mutual distrust, Koxinga successfully bridged these diverse socio-
economic interests and put them firmly under his leadership.  He was now able to set his sights beyond 
his twin bases of Xiamen and Jinmen.77
iii. Koxinga’s grand strategy and the northern expedition
　Koxinga decided to launch a campaign to seize the Yangtze River delta in 1655, when it became 
clear that negotiations with the Qing had failed and he faced an attack from Jidu.  According to 
many Chinese historians, this expedition illustrates the willingness to bet everything he had on his 
unwavering loyalty to the Ming and the destined cause.  On the one hand, the increasingly aggressive 
Qing policy towards him aggravated the food shortage and forced him to look farther north in search 
of grain stores and trading opportunities.  There are many truths to their claims, but “it must be 
emphasized that Koxinga also possessed the confidence to confront the Qing directly after a decade of 
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military and commercial expansion.” 78
　In 1657, he had a powerful force of approximately 180,000 men and 3,000 war junks.  Koxinga 
seems to have planned the campaign carefully in advance and not reacted passively to the Qing 
onslaught.  In fact, “the expedition formed but one part of a brilliant vision that represented nothing 
short of a wholesale redirection and redefinition of his priorities in the face of a changing geopolitical 
environment.” 79  His grand strategy took into account both his ideological convictions and material 
interests.
　Tactically, being able to occupy the Yangtze River delta, the empire’s most prosperous area and 
the Qing’s largest source of income, would allow Koxinga to permanently solve his pressing food and 
supply needs.  He would have direct access to the main production bases of silk and other luxury 
goods and be able to ship them directly overseas from the area’s wonderful ports.  This would lift the 
economy out of recession.80
iv. The Yangtze River delta or Taiwan
　At a strategic level, Koxinga intended that, if he invaded, the Ming restoration movement would 
regain its momentum and the Yongli court and others would have the momentum to stand up against 
the Manchu.  In the best possible scenario, Koxinga was supposed to receive a “huge chunk of 
empire,” including the Yangtze River delta region and the entire southeastern coast, as an autonomous 
part of the restored Ming Empire.81 
　Finally, if all else failed, Koxinga prepared to go into exile in Southeast Asia.  He could use that 
region’s abundant natural resources to help himself and his soldiers, exporting those goods to China. 
Dutch Taiwan and the Spanish Philippines became the most ideal targets, as each had a huge Chinese 
immigrant population.  Taiwan was controlled from Zeelandia and Provintia, and the Philippines were 
controlled from Manila.82
Map.1
Source:
In 1659, Koxinga attacked Qing-held Nanjing.
On August 24, the siege began but cavalry attacks by 
the city’s forces were successful. 
Koxinga’s forces were defeated.
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V. From the northern expedition to Taiwan
　After the failure of the northern expedition, Koxinga looked to Taiwan as a means to contest the 
Qing government’s strict sea bans.  However, his men were reluctant to change the direction of the 
expedition.  The negative attitude of Koxinga’s own followers towards invading Taiwan is in stark 
contrast to the enthusiastic support of Chinese residents of that island, estimated to be 50,000 in 1660. 
They were burdened by heavy taxes and only too eager to change their leadership.  In the countryside 
near Tayouan and Provintia, Dutch officials had been hearing reports of Han farmers who were inciting 
the natives to rebel when they got word of Koxinga’s arrival.83
　Not only Koxinga, but also his organization, directly protected the lives and property of his fellow 
traders and diaspora, standing up for them against foreign governments, and linked their grace to their 
wellbeing.  The VOC performed to some extent the same function, but mainly for their  employees and 
officials, and above all, for their shareholders in Amsterdam.
　In the field of ideology and class, an influential segment of Koxinga’s followers based on the 
mainland branched off from the organization’s stance toward overseas Chinese as a whole. 
Nevertheless, Koxinga made the decision to continue with the attack on the Dutch holdings, against 
the wishes of the majority of his men.  According to him at this time, “Taiwan would only serve as a 
temporary base for his troops to recuperate free of Manchu harassment” 84 until they could reenter the 
battle for Ming restoration.  He resolutely denied coveting the land abroad to expand his peace and 
happiness.
　Kroozier sees Koxinga’s rhetoric as a shift from his previous commitment to the Ming in favor of 
the “sea kingdom dominating East Asia’s trade routes.”  Similarly, Wills believes that Taiwan, which 
formed “part of his legacy as a son of a despicable father,” stood in opposition to his legacy as “the Lord 
of the Empire’s Surname.”  However, he was also ready to settle down and began to associate with the 
mainland under “barbaric” rule.  Although Koxinga’s action certainly pointed to indefinite suspension 
or abandonment of the restoration of the Ming Dynasty, “it did not represent a prioritization of filial 
piety above his carefully crafted self-image as a loyal minister.” 85
Map. 2       
Source: Tonio Andrade, Lost Colony, Princeton 
University Press, 2011.
In January 1662, Koxinga’s men, acting on the 
advice of a German defector, occupied a strategic 
redoubt that overlooked Zeeland.
Altar to Koxinga in Tainan, Taiwan
Source：奈良修一, 『鄭成功』, 山川出版社, 2016年, 79－80ページ
（Shuichi Nara, Koxinga, Tokyo, 2016, pp.79-80）。
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　In surrender ultimatums to the Dutch, “Koxinga became the first individual to speak of Taiwan not 
as a wild frontier, but an integral part of China since time immemorial.” 86  The reimagined sovereignty 
of Taiwan as “belonging to the government of China” complemented the legacy of his father, who had 
“lent” this Chinese Taiwan to the Dutch as a Ming imperial official.
　It is true that opening new land and turning his soldiers into farmers became a practical requirement 
for Koxinga to resolve the acute labor shortage on the island.  Fundamentally, the limited number of 
full-time Han farmers and the indigenous slash-and-burn agricultural economies could not support his 
30,000 men, who already accounted for three-fifths of the pre-invasive Chinese population! 87
　Yet, his actions also reflected the product of a broader vision, conceived perhaps with the assistance 
of He Tingbin, Zheng Zhilong’s old genius, and the then-Dutch East India Company, well before 
the invasion of Taiwan.  Koxinga was attempting to transform a peripheral island into a new bastion 
of “civilization,” in his words, “a foundational endeavor that cannot be uprooted for ten thousand 
generations.” 88  He was able to sidestep Ming recovery by extending it to Taiwan, recentering it, and 
then deferring his return to the mainland indefinitely.
2-3 Koxinga as an Imperial Hero
　The following is the conventional view of Koxinga as a hero that a Japanese historian wrote in his 
booklet of Zheng Chenggong, who was born in Japan.89  During the Ming-Qing transition period, many 
persons were loyal to more than a single dynasty, as seen in Wu Sangui who returned to the Ming after 
siding with the Qing.  The Zheng administration was loyal to the end, from Koxinga to his son Jing 
and grandson Kezang, using the year of the chronicle Yongli of Ming.  That is why in the eyes of Qing 
Emperor Kangxi, who honors Confucianism, they were considered to be honorable followers.
　This same historian describes Koxinga in popular culture as follows: There are many secret 
societies in China, among which “Hong men” is famous.  According to tradition, Koxinga created this 
organization.  It is probably because of Koxinga’s consistent anti-Qing restoration activities and his 
loyalty that such traditions persist. In modern times, according to the historian, Koxinga’s expulsion of 
Dutch power from Taiwan is seen as a symbol of anti-colonialism.90
　On the other hand, Xing Hang’s conclusion, based on many facts and interpretations, is different: 
Despite the premature death of Koxinga, he laid the foundation for a maritime Chinese territorial state 
centered on Taiwan.  That is significant.
It is apparent from his actions that he was fully prepared to abandon the cause of restoration 
on the mainland in favor of a broader vision of recentering the Ming on Taiwan as the 
foundation for a maritime Chinese empire.91
　Hang bases his interpretation of Koxinga’s actions on the idea of this maritime “empire.”  On the 
other hand, based on a decree by Koxinga, Japanese historian who researched Chinese history Makoto 
Ueda set up a “one hypothesis”: Koxinga conceived “a kingdom spreading in the sea area, independent 
of a continent China controlled by the Qing Dynasty.” 92  The date of the decree is June 27, 1656. In 
short, the decree strictly prohibited trading with Manila and ordered the return to Xiamen port against 
the Chinese of Tainan where the Dutch East India Company was based at the time.  Koxinga had 
already set up his own regime in 1655, and the Ming administration confirmed him as the Prince of 
Yanping. Thus, he had already gained the legitimacy to declare the will of the people as the head of one 
independent kingdom.
　According to Ueda, Koxinga’s vision that can be read from the 1656 decree against the Tainan 
Chinese was to finance himself by exporting goods purchased from China’s inland areas (via the Five 
Mountain Firms); to protect the Chinese living in the trading areas under his control; and to gain an 
edge over the Dutch and Spanish by taking control of the China Seas, thus obtaining the necessary 
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supplies for war against the Qing Dynasty.93
　In order to put the above activities into practice, Koxinga had to maintain absolute control of his 
organization, and no slight failure was allowed.  If the reins were to loosen even a little, the organization 
could collapse.  Koxinga’s punitive principle was inevitable.  However, many of his men were highly 
“independent,” such as those who were pirate captains, and often did not move according to Koxinga’s 
instructions.94
　Koxinga searched for an empire or kingdom independent from the Ming Empire, although he did 
not abandon the goal of Ming restoration.  The base was Taiwan for the time being.  It is certain that 
the Dutch rule did not seem good to Koxinga, but it is doubtful that the welfare of the Taiwanese 
people was his ultimate goal.
　Koxinga and his descendants were eventually defeated by the Qing Dynasty, yet the pattern of the 
maritime state finally helped the Qing Empire to become a world empire. In that sense, I would call 
Koxinga the eventual hero of the empire.
　Finally, I will confirm the circumstances and meaning of China becoming a world empire.  The 
Chinese dynasties from ancient Qin to Song were the only empires in the East Asian world.  There 
was little opportunity to realize that there was a world other than the world where China was the 
single center.  Of course, intercourse with the external society of the East Asian world was still present 
during this period, and there were powers that resisted or threatened the rule of the Chinese emperor. 
However, they were regarded in the logic of the order of the Chinese “world” as “barbarians,” whom 
the benefits of civilization did not reach.95
　However, after the Mongol conquests of the 13th century, the premise of the spatial imagination of 
the Chinese emperor’s rule changed a lot.  The enormous resulting Mongol empire, which spanned 
Europe and Asia, placed the Chinese emperor in a position to govern within a larger concept of 
universality.  In other words, the realization of the universality of the Chinese “world” was no longer 
sufficient. It became the imperial logic to conceive of multiple “worlds” on the meta-level.  Makoto 
Ueda summarizes this change as from the Chinese empire in the context of East Asia to the world 
empire in the context of East Eurasia.96
　According to some researchers, part of the Qing Empire could be likened to a “southeast-oriented 
moon” since it is dominated by Confucian values under the control of the Ministry of Rites (Libu) as 
well as the policy of nurturing reciprocal relations typical of a maritime state; while the other part of 
the Empire could be likened to a “northwestern moon” because it corresponds to China’s position as a 
mainland Eurasian state.97
　As a result, Koxinga is to be considered as the hero who prepared the establishment of the world 
empire “Qing,” though it is quite different from the traditional hero image mentioned at the beginning 
of this section.
Chapter 3. Bandits and Power at the Western and Eastern Ends 
of the Eurasian Continent
　What if Zheng Zhilong’s political behavior was compared with Nurhaci and his successors who made 
the Qing into a world empire in Chinese history? Zhilong’s organization lacked the definite vocabulary 
or successful historical precedent to describe its efforts to dominate East Asian seas.  It was somehow 
coexisting as a separate entity rather than defeating the dynastic order established in China. Its 
indefinite legal status and the inability to release itself from the legitimacy left by outsiders, such as the 
Netherlands, made it essentially fragile.
　Unlike the Zheng, Nurhaci and his descendants successfully “grafted” their tribal customs and 
military hierarchy onto “the Confucian orthodoxy” supported by the Ming ruling class to rule “a 
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massive, sedentary Chinese empire” for about three centuries.98  Nurhaci was a member of the Jurchen 
tribes (who hunted but were also sedentary) and made his Qing Dynasty a world empire. In this 
chapter, we will focus on the nomads who became the “frontiermen” of the empires, as opposed to the 
merchant-pirates who were defeated by the tribal dynasty but contributed to the establishment of the 
world empire.
　Let us look at the Zheng family issue again, the third wave of Chinese pirates, and the pirates on 
the eastern fringe of Eurasia. Zheng Zhilong stands at the top of many leading pirates who exercised 
their influence on the frontiers of East Asian seas.  What differentiated Zheng from his precedents Li 
Dan and Lin Feng were that Zhilong and his descendants were closest to achieving sustained political 
control over the zone of commercial activity.  In the 17th century at least, the family can be said to 
be a participant in the broad process of national construction and delineation of the entire Eurasian 
continent.
　I would like to mention here that China’s coastal areas tend to have their own governance system. 
Because of that tendency, Zheng Zhilong and his son Koxinga could use the Manchus’ entry into 
China in 1644 and the beginning of a global severe economic recession to turn their commercial 
organization into a pro-Ming resistance.  They acted as an independent authority for the majority of the 
southeastern coast, nominally serving the far-off Ming emperor.  Their activities, thus, politicized the 
entire region.99
　However, the Qing began to recover from the 1680s.  Commercialization with rapid population 
growth stimulated the unceasing demand for necessities, and the Qing Empire became more 
dependent on imports than ever before.  China again became a huge sink of silver from Europe and 
America.  Also, cotton and wool, and later opium, were imported.  Traditional consumption of natural 
resources and tropical products expanded from Southeast Asia and came to include the entire Pacific 
Rim.  In exchange, China continued to sell luxury items such as silk and porcelain. 
　From the 1780s, authorities began to notice that the number of pirates suddenly resuscitated in 
southern China, especially around Canton, Chaozhou, and Xiamen.  Piracy was a very big problem, and 
in 1780 Emperor Qianlong approved a new law specifically targeting pirates around Canton who were 
active in bands of more than 10 men.100 
　At the beginning of the 19th century, fleets of ocean-going ships became dominant among pirates 
on the southern coast.  The vast majority of these pirates came from the discontented underclass of 
laboring poor.  Seafarers, who could not rely on year-round employment or enough wages to prevent 
debt, did not distinguish, as did officials, between occupation and income as legitimate or illegitimate.
　From the 16th to 17th centuries, European monarchs, statesmen, and merchants all supported 
corsair ventures important to both state construction and commercial growth, resulting in a significant 
expansion and global scope of Western piracy.  The Ming and early Qing rulers adopted anti-
commercial policies that banned maritime trade, thereby driving merchants into piracy.  In China, 
piracy was never supported by national policy.  For various reasons, as above, merchants played a 
dominant role in both Western and Chinese piracy before 1700.101
　However, from 1700, the nature of piracy changed dramatically at both ends of the Eurasian 
continent.  In the West, the power of the state and the profits from legitimate trade steadily grew, and 
merchants pressured political leaders to suppress piracy.  The governments responded by passing 
strict new laws and building navies to protect merchant ships on the high seas.  In China, after Manchu 
solidification of authority by 1684, the court dramatically abolished maritime bans and promoted 
maritime trade.  From 1720, the court began to enact a series of laws to protect private property, 
including new strict laws against piracy.  When trade was reopened, most merchants ceased to be 
pirates and, like in the West, became partners with the state in pirate suppression.
　Western piracy began to decline after 1700 and almost disappeared in Asian waters by the end of the 
18th century.  However, Chinese piracy reached a new peak between 1780 and 1810.  In the maritime 
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world of southern China, tens of thousands of poor, alienated sailors had been driven into piracy as 
a means of survival.  In this way, the pirates from the middle to the end of the Qing dynasty were as 
much the cause of social unrest as the Taiping.102
　In the west of the Eurasian continent, several empires competed for dominance and populated their 
borderlands with quasi-military groups as defense against their rivals.  One such group, the Uskoks, 
arose at the beginning of the 17th century as defenders of Habsburg lands against the Ottoman 
Empire.  The Morlaks, who were part of the Uskok lineage, lost their raison d’etre when a new 
Ottoman-Habsburg border was established in 1699.  However, as Rieber said, Cossacks occupied a 
similar position as Morlaks on the border in the Russian Empire.  Like the Morlaks, the Cossacks were 
an example of a nomadic group that was gradually incorporated into the early modern empire.
　Until the Austro-Turkish wars from the end of the 17th to the beginning of 18th centuries, dynamic 
borderlands were almost constantly in the process of expansion, a process in which the arrival of new 
colonists and their progress in the search for land played a crucial role.  We can identify this with 
Rieber’s model of “dynamic boundaries of advanced settlements.”  Although the Russo-Kazakh border 
was located relatively far from the center of the Russian Empire, the settlement process advanced 
during the 18th century.  The process can be divided into state-led settlements and spontaneous 
settlements.  Among the settlers who belonged to the first type, the Cossacks stood out.  They were 
“representatives of non-Slavic peoples,” while the bulk of the “spontaneous” settlers consisted of 
peasants and so on.103
　In the 18th century, the implementation of a “systematic border policy” began, the immediate result 
of which was the “raising of boundary lines.”  The task of the borderlines was, first of all, to protect the 
territory of the Russian Empire and the local population from the incursions of neighboring Kazakhs.104
　The peculiarity of the Russo-Kazakh border is that the creation of a border system took place 
at the same time as the process of (voluntary) entry of part of the Kazakh tribes into the ranks of 
imperial subjects.105  Extending the status of imperial subjects to nomadic tribes and the resulting 
sedentarization were just some of the methods that Russia more or less successfully applied to stabilize 
or reduce pressure on its southeastern border.  The importance of sedentarization was that by tying 
the Kazakhs to a certain territory, Russia could not only significantly reduce the intensity of their illegal 
border crossings but also establish more effective control over the Kazakh tribes.  In addition, the 
process of “cultivation” took place at the Russo-Kazakh border, which essentially boiled down to “the 
education of representatives of the Kazakh elite following the Russian pattern.” 106
　Next, let us look at the characteristics of the Yaik (Ural) Cossacks 107, comparing them with the 
Habsburg Military Border The Yaik Cossacks had disproportionately greater autonomy than the 
fronteiersmen on the Military Border, who already in the early 17th century were directly subordinate 
to the military authorities (Karlovac commander).  One possible reason for this is the isolation of the 
Yaik Cossack community, located in the far southeast of the Russian Empire, far from the influence 
of Moscow (St. Petersburg).  On the other hand, the Military Border was located in the immediate 
hinterland of the Inner Austrian countries whose representatives played a decisive role in its 
management, subordinating the whole area and its inhabitants to their interests during the formation 
of the Military Border.  It was possible because Habsburgs and their Austrian estates introduced clear, 
new governmental structures in political and military sphere and ensured steady income from taxes 
based one the agreement of social and political elites – the taxes financed military logistics and local 
resistance groups like Uskoks and Vlachs/Morlaks and successfully thwarted the Ottoman threat. 
(On the other hand, though it was a temporary phenomenon, the Morlaks’ autonomy recognized by 
Venice is as described in Chapter 1.)  In the first half of the 18th century, the central authorities of the 
Russian Empire, encouraged by the comprehensive reforms of Peter I, attempted to implement a series 
of measures aimed at the military-administrative reorganization of the Yaik Cossacks.  A similar effort 
was made by the Austrian military authorities through a series of reforms (1730s-1750s), among which 
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Sachsen-Hildburghausen’s reform is the most famous. 
　In both cases, new military duties, specifically the obligation to serve in wars beyond the borders 
of their home region, were more strictly imposed on the inhabitants.  These military-administrative 
reforms, which were accompanied by the abolition of various privileges, were the reason why in 
the middle of the second half of the 18th century, organized armed uprisings such as the Severin 
rebellion(1755.) and the Pugachov revolt occurred in many Military Border and Cossack communities.
　Similar to the reform of the Military Frontier, the reorganization of the Yaik Cossack Army resulted 
from the need to create reliable military units that could be used to control the southeastern borders of 
the Empire and wage war on European fronts.
*************************************************************
Epilog
　This paper started with a project of comparative research on pirates but eventually ended by showing 
the history and meaning of nomads’ incorporation into the Venetian Republic and the Russian Empire, 
and the transfer of Chinese sea power into the Qing Empire. 
　During this period, both Russia and China were established as early modern empires.  The Russian 
emperor did not enforce Orthodox or Russianization policies for the frontier rule and recognized the 
nomads’ uniqueness for a while.  The Qing emperor, on the other hand, acted as a Buddhist king rather 
than a Chinese emperor in Tibet and Mongolia. In other words, the Qing established the universality 
meta-leveled by taking a distance from the individual world.  Norihisa Yamashita calls the structure 
of one spatial imagination early modern empire, structured by sharing universality as an abstract 
philosophy.
　Yamashita explains this panorama of human history from the plurality of the world as follows: 
There are times in human history when the plurality of the world will be relatively suppressed and 
others when it will be at the forefront.  In the most recent phase, the first is the period of the early 
modern empire, and the latter is the period from the second half of the 19th century, when there was a 
“great change” with the collapse of the early modern empire, to this day, when the visualization of the 
plurality of the world reaches a critical point with a new globalization.108
　Koxinga is located in the period of the early modern empire shown in Figure 1, and so are Uskok 
and Stojan.
　Yamashita further captures the modern empire and today’s “empire (universalistic space without 
borders)” in a single framework using the keyword universalism.  He also divides universalism into 
positive universalism, negative universalism, and meta (one level higher) universalism.  Positive 
universalism tries to contain the Polanyi anxiety mentioned at the beginning of this article.  However, it 
is only a denial of the world’s plurality, and it only brings a tyranny without persistence.109
　Next, negative universalism tries to paradoxically derive universal solidarity by refusing to impose 
Source: Norihisa Yamashita,“Empire or Post-Empire?: the Concept of ‘Long Century’ and the Consequences of Globalization,” in Kimitaka 
Matsuzato (ed.), Emerging Meso-Areas in the Former Socialist Countries: Histories Revived or Improvised? (Sapporo, 2005).
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any universalist claim.  On the other hand, meta-universalism thinks that Polanyi’s anxiety (about the 
absence of norms that presuppose order) is not a new situation at the end of modernization, but rather 
a normal state in human history.  This idea comes from the meta-universal stance that the structure 
which presupposes various norms is constantly evolving, that is, the norm of the order is constantly 
being replaced.
　Such an attitude, after all, demands an ethical attitude.  It is assumed that all others are familiar with 
universality as the premise of all judgments, and universalist violence comes from a source that drives 
others into the individualist category.
　Meta-universalists, on the other hand, start from the fact that others are potentially universalists. 
What we need to do then is to observe what is happening in the communication with which we are 
involved and the constant feedback to the norms that will be shared between us and others.
　Thus, it seemed that the western and eastern ends of Eurasia since the early modern period were 
just incorporated into the empire (or the nation that was aiming at the empire) and the problem was 
solved.  However, it is only on the surface after all, and the problem is still visible today.  This can be 
seen now by looking at Croatia (as well as Bosnia), the Caucasus, Taiwan (Hong Kong as of 2019), and 
Inner Mongolia. In this way, the visualization of the plurality of the world reaches a critical point with a 
new globalization
　This article is a historical study which defends the idea and attitude of meta-universalism that 
believes in universality and should be constantly confirmed in the people’s dialogue.
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